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Abstract 
Classical decision theory formulas have been combined with more recent theories from psycho-social origins (such 
as Rosenstock’s health belief model, Fisbein’s rational action theory, Bandura’s concept of self-efficacy, Triandis’ 
concern for the assessment of habits, etc.). A software, called PROACTA, enables simulations of actual cases. 
Currently, it is being tested in various backgrounds. It is orientated in order to help conceive intervening strategies, 
especially in the area of patient education. Examples of a case study are presented. 
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1. Introduction 
It is now largely acknowledged by patient edu- 
cation specialists that patients’ behaviors are 
mainly influenced by subjective factors such as 
health beliefs [1,2], locus of control [3,4], percep- 
tion of self-efficacy [5,6], perceived norms [7], etc. 
Generally, these factors are considered as inde- 
pendent variables in a model where the dependent 
variable is the behaviour itself [8]. Frequently, 
authors note that ‘direct observation casts doubts 
on the consistency between patients’ knowledge 
and beliefs and their real behaviour’ [9] or that 
there exists a ‘knowledge/behaviour gap’ [lo]. 
Conversely, other researchers ‘showed that belief 
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scores predicted (by discriminant analysis) com- 
pliance, especially in the long-term’ [l 11. The ca- 
pacity of psycho-social models to enlighten 
comprehension and prediction of real behaviours 
is impaired by the lack of an intermediate layer, 
i.e. the estimation (by the patient himself, by the 
carers.. . and by a theoretical model) of the Ten- 
dency To Occur (TTO) of various actions. This 
implies the need to process a step beyond be- 
haviour itself. 
A metaphor may be needed here. The same 
kind of epistemological problem has arisen in the 
assessment of human knowledge. For years, under 
the (over) behaviouristic pressure to rely only on 
‘objectivity’, only behaviours have been taken into 
account. For instance, only the student’s answer 
(correct, incorrect) to a question is considered as a 
sound basis to estimate this person’s competency 
in the tested domain. During the last 30 years, 
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psychologists and educationists have started to 
ask the learner to add to his/her answer a confi- 
dence degree [12], enabling the researcher to com- 
pute an index of realism, and to distinguish 
several types of ‘knowledge’. For instance, Hunt 
[21] distinguishes 4 types of a person’s ‘status of 
knowledge’: (a) informed (correct answer and 
high confidence); (b) partially informed (correct 
answer and intermediate confidence); (c) unin- 
formed (low confidence); (d) misinformed (incor- 
rect answer and high confidence). 
A series of researchers have developed ‘objec- 
tive ways to approach subjectivity’, especially ‘the 
human capacity of self-estimating’ [12], based on 
De Finetti’s basic assumptions [ 131: ‘Partial infor- 
mation exists. To detect it is necessary and feasi- 
ble (p. 109)’ and ‘It is only subjective probability 
that can give an objective meaning to every re- 
sponse and scoring method (p. 111)‘. 
2. Tendency to occur (TTOs) of behaviours in 
patient education 
It is suggested here that the same kind of 
approach should be adopted in the prediction or 
explanation or even prescription of patients’ be- 
haviour: try to estimate the ‘tendency to occur’ 
(TTO) of several behaviours, in order to distin- 
guish various types of situations such as: (a) 
Clear-cut behaviour: the adopted one has a TTO 
largely superior to any other possible behaviour 
and there is no inter-behaviour ‘competition’, no 
regret for the non-adopted ones. This is important 
if QOL (quality of life) is also considered. (b) 
Slightly better than the second: the behaviour 
adopted has a ‘IT0 equivalent to an other be- 
haviour’s TTO, so that one of them ‘comes out’ 
apparently on the basis of a random process. 
Actually, situational circumstances (what has just 
been seen, heard, experienced in the previous sec- 
onds or minutes) become of great predictory 
value. In this situation, regret may exist for the 
non-adopted competing behaviour and any op- 
portunity to switch to it (in a compensation mech- 
anism) would be seized by the patient. (c) 
Random choice: several behaviours have the same 
TTO and ‘switching effects’ may happen between 
more than 2 behaviours. (d) The least worst 
choice: in the dilemma situation, all courses of 
action are repulsive (because of negative conse- 
quences for instance). Therefore, the patient will 
‘minimise the losses’. 
PROACTA is an attempt to assess the TTOs of 
various courses of action (behaviours) by 2 
means: (a) a global one: (the patient’s direct esti- 
mation) of each action’s TTO; (b) an analytical 
one: the patient estimates a series of values for 
factors such as expected consequences, norms, 
self-efficacy, etc. On the basis of these data, the 
PROACTA software computes a TTO for each 
course of action. Three kinds of data can be 
compared, namely, the global TTOs, the analyti- 
cal TTOs and the actual patient behaviour. This 
‘triangulation’ enables validity and reliability 
studies. 
3. The underlying models of PROACTA 
3.1. Classical decision theories 
From Aristotle to modern decision theorists 
like Von Neuman and Morgenstern, and Tversky, 
models have been provided to encapsulate an 
individual’s decision into formulas. Basically, 
those formulas stand, on the one hand on the 
notion of utility (i.e. attractiveness or repulsive- 
ness of given consequences) and, on the other 
hand, on the notion of probability (i.e. the likeli- 
hood that a given action would lead to a given 
consequence). Modern Decision Theory sees deci- 
sion as the choice of the course of action that 
maximises the expected utility (i.e. the sum of the 
utilities of its consequences timed by their proba- 
bilities). From Bernouilli [14], utilities as well as 
probabilities are seen as subjective variables, i.e. 
they are given values by the decision-maker him- 
self, independently of more ‘objective’ (or ‘exter- 
nal’) estimates. 
3.2. Additions from social research 
Lewin, from his ‘Kriegslandschaff article to his 
‘Field Theory’ book [15,16] argued that individual 
(and collective) behaviours are influenced by the 
dynamics of ‘field forces’, some being internal and 
others external, mainly social. More recent social 
scientists have contributed to explore these field 
forces. For instance, Fishbein and Ajzen [7], in 
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their Rational Action Theory, stressed the im- 
portance of norms (perceived norms, nuanced by 
the ‘tendency to conform’ to them). Rotter [3] 
introduced the concept of ‘locus of control’, i.e. 
the feeling of having a personal control on the 
situation (internal attribution) or of being the 
object of external forces (external attribution), as 
well as the feeling of changeability (or not) of 
the situation. We will ‘merge’ this contribution 
with Bandura’s [5,6], as well as with Ajzen 
and Madden’s one [17,18] in their ‘Planned 
Behaviour Theory’, where the locus of control 
is placed between the intention and the 
actual adoption of a behaviour. As a quasi- 
symetrical concept, Rosenstock has suggested, 
in his Health Belief Model, that the perceived 
‘susceptibility’ (i.e. personal tendency, or vulner- 
ability) to a given consequence could also bias 
the choice of a course of action. 
3.3. Parcels of truth 
Each of the aforementioned contributors helps 
to better understand what may be the most 
complex object of study in the world: human 
thinking and behaviour processes. All of those 
contributions indicate how useful each of them 
is, their relative importance depending of the 
content, of the persons and of the circumstances. 
A more complete review of these contributions 
is to be found in Godin [ 191 who provides evi- 
dences of the relevance of all those theories (for 
instance, scholars such as Diclemente, Maddux, 
Stanley, Maddux and Strecher, Weinberg et al., 
etc. have provided experimental evidences of the 
relevance of the concept of self-efficacy pro- 
moted by Bandura. The same has been done by 
Becker to support Rosenstock’s Health Belief 
Model. Fishbein’s ideas about norms have been 
tested by Schlegel et al., Stutzman and Green, 
whereas Seibold and Ropper as well as Valuis 
have studied Fishbein’s model in conjunction 
with Triandis’ [20] one). Moreover, the individ- 
ual is conscious of some factors affecting his/her 
behaviour and not conscious of some others. 
Several parts of those models overlap with the 
other models, so that, in the PROACTA ap- 
proach described hereafter, we have kept only 
the non-overlapping concepts. 
3.4. Matching a set of gears 
Assuming that all the previous factors play a 
role in the selection of a given behaviour, it has 
been tried, in PROACTA, to combine them in 
order to study the effects of their interactions. 
PROACTA is nothing more than a simulation 
tool in which real or fictitious cases can be intro- 
duced. Its first utility is of a didactic nature, i.e. to 
help understand the theories themselves and their 
possible interrelations, i.e. a didactical goal. It is 
hoped, nevertheless, that PROACTA will densify 
the exchanges between theories and experimental 
(or experiential) data, to lead researchers about 
patients’ or students’ cases of behaviours. 
As is the case with any simulation tool, 
PROACTA is based on a series of assumptions 
that deserve to be made explicit (in section 4, 
below). 
3.5. Action-driven and consequence-driven 
problems 
Some problems are ‘action-driven’, i.e. the de- 
cision-maker is faced with alternative actions (to 
smoke or not, to marry this person or to remain 
bachelor) and the problem is to document the 
consequences. Other problems are ‘consequences- 
driven’; i.e. the person knows the goals to 
achieve (get money, lose weight, recover from 
illness) but does not know how, and has to ex- 
amine or imagine possible courses of actions. 
Depending on the situation, courses of actions 
or consequences will be defined first. Often, they 
are defined co-operatively. 
4. Assumptions or principles underlying 
PROACTA 
4.1. Courses of actions 
Principle 1. Courses of actions will be consid- 
ered as exclusive from each other, that forces to 
consider different combinations of elementary 
behaviours as different courses of actions. For 
instance, ‘to stop smoking’ is a different course 
of action from ‘to stop smoking and start 
jogging’. 
Principle 2. Qualitative changes in behaviour 
are a different course of action from quantitative 
changes. For instance, ‘to eat less’ is different 
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from ‘to eat the same amount as usual, but some- 
thing different’. 
Principle 3. ‘No change’ is a course of action. It 
may have negative (or positive) consequences. 
4.2. Consequences 
Principle 4. Different levels of quantitative 
changes can be considered as different conse- 
quences. For instance, losing 1 kg is a different 
consequence from losing 20 kg. Their psychologi- 
cal consequence, i.e. satisfaction (or frustration), 
may not be in a linear relationship with their 
physical size. Therefore, they should be consid- 
ered as distinct consequences. 
4.3. Tendencies to occur 
Principle 5. PROACTA computes the relative 
tendency to occur of each course of action, rang- 
ing from 0 to 100, the action with the highest 
tendency receiving arbitrarily a value of 100 and 
the action with the lowest tendency receiving a 
value of 0, the other actions having intermediate 
values (between these extremes), computed by ‘in- 
terpolations’. The unit (O-l and O-100) of each 
parameter has been chosen arbitrarily to facilitate 
computing and graphic representation. This sys- 
tem hides the ‘sign’ of each course of action, i.e. 
whether the action is generally (i.e. all factors 
being combined) ‘attractive’ (positive) or ‘repul- 
sive’ (negative). Those fundamental values can be 
obtained in the ‘behind the stages’ part of 
PROACTA, that keeps the original raw (positive 
and negative) values. It can happen that the per- 
son is facing a dilemma, when all the courses of 
action are repulsive (negative) and when the deci- 
sion process is to chose the solution that min- 
imises the losses (instead of maximising the gains). 
In other cases, the person is facing a ‘happy 
choices’ situation, where all choices come up with 
positive consequences. 
Principle 6. The central table of PROACTA (P 
table) is the matrix of probabilities for each action 
to lead to each consequence and the U vector (i.e. 
the utilities of consequences). The sum, for each 
action, of the UP combination (multiplication) is 
the first ‘provisory’ estimates of tendencies to occur. 
Principle 7. A ‘U-generating’ layer (optional) is 
constituted by factors ‘explaining’ the utilities, i.e. 
‘perceived susceptibility’, ‘norms about conse- 
quences’ (e.g. ‘My parents wish I lose a dozen 
kg’), ‘relative weight of norms and personal opin- 
ion’ about the desirability of consequences, etc. 
the combination of which result in the utility (or 
urgency or pressure). 
Principle 8. A ‘P-modifying’ layer (optional) is 
constituted by ‘self-efficacy regarding each action’, 
norms about actions and the ‘relative weights of 
norms and personal opinions’ (in other terms 
‘Motivation to Conformity = MC’ vs. ‘Motiva- 
tion to Autonomy = MA’). These factors can be 
defined before the central table, or be included by 
the interviewee in the Ps of the central table. In 
this last case, they have to be neutralised (see 
default values). 
Principle 9. A ‘final’ layer is constituted by the 
‘strength of habits’ (basically the frequency of 
each behaviour in the past), by situational ‘cir- 
cumstances favouring habits vs. intentions’ for 
each action, and, finally, by the strength of habits 
vs. the strength of intentions in this kind of 
problem in general (values provided by experts). 
Principle 10. The resulting prediction is the 
merging of several streams, even if it may appear 
as the end of a sequential process. The final scores 
do not appear at the end of the spreadsheet, but 
at the confluence of ‘pressure’ coming from habits 
(bottom of the spreadsheet) and ‘pressure’ coming 
from intentions (top of the spreadsheet). 
Intermediate values of computed scores are dis- 
played only to facilitate verification and to offer 
the basis of a graphic that should not be viewed 
as a sequential (from left to right) process even if 
lines in the graphic could be misleading in this 
respect. 
Principle 11. Several PROACTA analyses may 
be performed on the same case study, e.g. for the 
successive steps of the development of a problem. 
An example of such ‘evolution’ will be provided 
hereafter and shows to what degree output varies 
according to inputs. 
Principle 12. A ‘self-validation’ way of using 
PROACTA compares two types of data. On the 
one hand, a person is asked to analyse a single case 
he/she knows perfectly (because, for instance, it 
deals with a choice she/he had to make recently in 
his/her life, or because he/she was the physician in 
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charge of the patient), in the terms of all the 
‘intermediate variables’. On the other hand, this 
same person is invited to provide also the ‘final 
information’, i.e. what actually happened (the 
course of action with the value loo), what was 
likely or unlikely to have happened too (the 
other courses of action) with a score between 100 
and 0. 
Since the interviewee cannot combine the ele- 
mentary data (to produce the final scores or pre- 
dicted courses of actions or PCA) as PROACTA 
does, this sample of data (or actual courses of 
actions or ACA) offers an opportunity of testing 
the relevance (in terms of predictive efficiency of 
PCA vs. ACA) of PROACTA. Such an example 
will be provided hereafter. This approach has a 
drawback: intermediate values can be ‘connected’ 
in order to make PCA fit the final ‘actual courses 
of actions’. 
Principle 13. PROACTA can be ipsative, i.e. 
the interviewer may be the interviewee, and con- 
stitute a self-help in decision-making. 
Principle 14. If a course of action has the value 
100 and another the value 90, there is a possibility 
that the second one occurs instead of the first, or 
that regret (nostalgia) will accompany the choice 
of the first one. 
5. The current version of PROACTA 
Currently PROACTA is just an EXCELL 
spreadsheet for research and didactic purposes. 
Soon, a patient interface, showing only visual 
analog scales as used in pain assessment [24] will 
be developed. The current PROACTA software 
has several characteristics and limitations: (a) 
There may be 1-6 consequences, and from 2-4 
courses of action. If the problem actually has < 4 
courses of action, some of them (any one) should 
be ‘repeated’. One course of action could be the 
‘no change’ situation. (b) Grey areas have to be 
filled by the user. When designated, ‘& cells’ 
display appropriate ‘comments’ (the meaning and 
ranges of values for instance). (c) The resulting 
TTOs vary between 0 and 100. They are relative 
values (where maximum is always 100 and mini- 
mum is always 0). Absolute values are also com- 
puted. They show whether some courses of action 
are repulsive whereas others are attractive. It may 
happen that all courses of action are repulsive (in 
the dilemma situation). The patient then chooses 
the ‘least worst’ behaviour. (d) Ignoring factors 
(neutral and default values). The list presented 
below of ‘neutralising values’ actually constitutes 
a list of default values that enables one to work 
on a simplified version of PROACTA. It also 
indicates in which order PROACTA should be 
filled: central and final layers first. Anterior and 
intermediate should come after, only if default 
options do not fit the situation. 
Here is how factors can be neutralized 
Perceived norms (PN): Giving them the same 
values as the personal attractiveness. 
The relative weight (for each consequence) of 
the Motivation to Conform and the Motivation 
to Autonomy. Fixing them equal (50 and 50) i.e. 
weighted equally. 
The personal susceptibility (or feeling of per- 
sonal vulnerability) to each consequence: Fixing 
them all to the same value 1 (that means no more 
and no less than an average person). 
The self-efficacy values (S) for each action: Fix- 
ing them all to the same value 1 (no more and no 
less than an average person). 
The perceived norms values (N) for each action: 
Fixing them all to the same value 1 (no more and 
no less than an average person). 
The Motivation to Conform and Motivation to 
Autonomy balance values (MC and MA): Fixing 
them equal (50 and 50) for each action. 
6. The PROACTA questionnaire 
Numerical values can be provided for 
PROACTA through a written (or oral) question- 
naire. It will be displayed hereafter, filled with 
answers from an actual case study, documented 
by Dr Jacqueline Cronier, head of the Radiology 
and Echography department of the ‘Centre Hos- 
pitalier de Puteaux’ in France. (See Table 1). 
6.1. The analytical approach 
The following values have been introduced in a 
PROACTA spreadsheet. 
Question a. How would you introduce the prob- 
lem, its origins and the main issues? 
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Table 1 
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For economical reasons, a hospital is to be transormed; in particular, the surgery department will be replaced by a geriatric (less 
prestigious) one. What will the nurse do? Stay and convert to geriatrics or apply to an other hospital’s surgery department? 
(Situation 1989) 
I 
17 Priorities of actions = 
-](16H) Force of Habits (FH) = 
-;(lS) Statistics of Habits ( from 0 to 1) 
f  
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1989: A hospital is about to be transformed, for 
economical reasons; in particular, the surgery de- 
partment will be phased out and replaced by a 
geriatric department. A nurse, specialised in 
surgery (the most honorific department to work in 
as a nurse) is faced with the decision to stay in the 
hospital and convert herself into a (less honorific) 
specialisation (geriatrics) or to apply to for reloca- 
tion to surgery departments of other hospitals. 
Question b. What are the Courses of Actions 
(CoA) to be considered? (and your self-efficacy 
S.E. for each of them?) 
CoA 1 = Actively accept reconversion to geriatrics 
(i.e. try to reach top qualification in this new 
domain) : 0 
CoA 2 = Passively accept reconversion to geri- 
atrics (i.e. take no initiative, let things happen) 0.1 
CoA 3 = Apply to surgery departments of other 
hospitals : 1 
CoA 4 = Ask for ‘health vacations’ or technical 
unemployment : 0 
Question c. What are the consequences to be 
considered and their attractiveness? 
Cl = Professional progress : 1 
C2 = Proximity of home : 0.5 
C3 = Prestige of the department : 1 
C4 = Lack of interaction (demented aged people) : 
-1 
C5 = Incapacity of preventing people’s death : 
- 0.6 
C6 = Heaviness of physical work-load : - 0.8 
Question d. What is the relative weight, in this 
problem of intention? : 90%; of habits? : 10%. 
Question e. What is the outcome expectancies or 
probabilities of success (Ps) of each action vs. each 
cbnsequence, here? 
vs. professional progress: ‘Accept actively’ (20) is 
4 times more likely than ‘accept passively’ (5) and 
4 times less likely than ‘apply to another hospital’ 
(80), whereas ‘ask for vacations’ is the certainty of 
no professional progress (0). 
vs. proximity of home: ‘Apply to another hospital’ 
is 2 times less likely (50) than other actions (100). 
vs. prestige: ‘Apply to another hospital ‘is 10 times 
more likely (100) than the 2 modes of acceptance 
(10). ‘Ask for vacations’ is the certainty of no 
prestige (0). 
vs. lack of human interaction: ‘Acceptance’ ex- 
poses 4 times more (80) and ‘ask for vacations’ 5 
times more (100) to this danger than ‘apply to 
another hospital’ (20). 
vs. incapacity vs. death: same as for ‘lack of 
human interaction’. 
vs. physical/moral load: ‘Apply to another hospi- 
tal’ is 5 times less likely (20) to come up with 
physical load than accept (loo), and ‘ask for 
health vacations’ is rather likely (75) to provoke 
moral load (culpability). 
Questionf. How frequent has been the action in 
the past (max = loo)? 
10 To ‘accept actively’ (Mary is used to adapting, 
but in her domain); 
2 To ‘accept passively’ (not at all her style); 
100 To ‘apply for change’ (Mary often takes 
initiatives); 
2 To ‘ask for health interruption’ (not at all her 
style). 
Question g. What are the perceived norms ? 
(0.5 being neutral): 
0.8 To ‘accept actively’; 
0.2 To ‘accept passively’; 
1 To ‘apply for change’; 
0.1 To ‘ask for vacations’. 
Question h. Are conditions in favour of a ‘non- 
habitual solution?’ (Yes, if the score is > 50, No, 
if < 50): 
70 To ‘accept actively’; 
70 To ‘accept passively’; 
50 To ‘apply for change’; 
30 To ‘ask for health interruption’; 
Question i. What is your susceptibility to each 
consequence (and why)? 
Cl = Professional progress : 1 (No more, no less 
than anyone) 
C2 = Proximity of home : 0.7 (Several hospitals 
are in the other neighbourhood) 
C3 = Prestige of the department : 1 (No more, no 
less than...) 
C4 = Lack of interaction : 1 (Idem) 
C5 = Incapacity of preventing death : 1 (Idem) 
C6 = Physical workload : 1.5 (A little less resistant 
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The nurse has followed specialised courses on geriatrics and discovered the physical and psychological approaches of ageing persons. 
She is no longer afraid of demented persons. Conditions to convert to geriatrics are fulfilled, even if she is still nostalgic of the past 
(Situation 1991). 
l(2) Conseauences 
PhysicaUmarat load 1 -’ 
6 UP Absolute values (with sign) 
7UP Relative values (without sign) 
Self Efficacv (Bandura) : from 0 to 1 
/ SUPS 
m 
&ONP, Perceived Norm (Fishbkn) - TAR : 
(10MC) Motivation to Conform (idem) : 
I 7 7UPSN 
I(1 2) C = Conditions ( favoring I unfavoring) actions 
-i 73UPSNC 
I7 Priorities of actions = (FH * HC) + (FI ’ UPSNC) 
~~?%~~~f Habit !FH) =[ r-7 
$14) Statistics of Hablts (from 0 to 100) 
1 SK 
! 
Courses of Action 
iP I 5P I 5P I5P I 
100 50 100 
10 100 0 
80 20 100 
40 80 20 100 
100 100 20 75 
451 01 100 1 0 
I I I 
I 
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Table 3 
The nurse has followed a training session for head nurses in geriatrics. The mourning process concerning her past activity is over. 
She has fully renounced to its technical aspects, and has discovered the organisational personnel management and institutional 
aspects of the new one (Situation 1993). 
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Question j. What are the norms about conse- 
quences (and their sources) and what are their 
relative weights: (Motivation to Conform (MC) 
versus Motivation to Autonomous behaviour 
(MA))? What is the balance? 
MC/MA 
Cl = Professional progress : 0.7 (My husband’s 
opinion) 50/50 
C2 = Proximity of home : 0.5 (Idem) SO/SO 
C3 = Prestige of the department : 1 (Idem) 50/50 
C4 = Lack of interaction : -0.5 (Idem) 50/50 
C5 = Incapacity of preventing death : -0.4 
(Idem) 50/50 
C6 = Heaviness of physical workload : - 1 (Idem) 
50/50 
6.2. The global question 
What should be PROACTA’s results in terms 
of ‘tendencies to occur’ for each of the 4 Courses 
of Action (CoA): 5, 0, 100 and O? 
6.3. The PROACTA computation 
The spreadsheet produces the following ‘predic- 
tions’ (from the analytical approach): 7, 0.3, 100, 
0. The proximity of the 2 last sets of values is not 
considered as a demonstration of the predictive 
validity of PRACTA, since the original data have 
been ‘fine-tuned’ by the author in the process of 
shaping PROACTA itself. From the numbers, 
action 3 (apply for another hospital) would have 
been chosen (no other possible action being com- 
peting with). 
6.4. Did changes occur in the situation ? 
During 1989-1991, events happened (the nurse 
received courses on ageing persons, etc...), result- 
ing in new values (in dark cells) and new be- 
havioural tendencies, see the second PROACTA 
example where the ‘expected final values’ were 
100, 0, 66, 0 (Table 2). Therefore, action 1 is now 
the more likely, but with regrets for action 2 (not 
adopted). In 1993, another major change occurred 
(orientation to team management), that gives rise 
to another (and last) PROACTA example, where 
the ‘expected final values’ were 100, 0, 25, 0. In 
this third step, action will be selected, but without 
regret (Table 3). 
7. Conclusions 
Although the case study that has been inten- 
sively developed here does not deal with a patient 
but with a nurse, PROACTA has been designed 
to fit various health education problems - pa- 
tient education, drug consumption prevention, 
nutritional education, urgency help behaviour, 
AIDS prevention, etc. It seems obvious that 
PROACTA can be applied not only in (retro) 
descriptions but also in prediction, in dialogues, 
in decision-making, either in an ipsative (reflexive) 
way, or between a health professional and a pa- 
tient, or for the health professional inner dialogue 
only, as a help to diagnosis. The scope is even 
broader than education or health: intentions of 
votes and collective decision-making, purchase de- 
cisions, partnership choices, vocational orienta- 
tion, help of people in need of an urgent support, 
etc. Several simulations (with imaginary data) 
have been performed. Even if they do not predict 
actual behaviours, they constitute a stimulating 
way to investigate intervening factors and detect 
more specifically where and how deep is our 
ignorance, in Bachelard’s terms: ‘Reality is never 
what we could believe, but always what we should 
have thought’. 
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